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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic framework which implements risk
as a continuous variable into the proximity-concentration trade-off
concept. Additionally firms have the possibility to postpone their
investment decision which gives them the possibility to collect further
information about the volatile variable over time. On the basis of the
real option theory (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) an investment plan under
uncertainty is derived. In contrast to static models firms postpone
their investment decision although positive returns can be achieved.
For specific risk values the model predicts, in the presence of a foreign
direct investment choice, the export strategy can be rejected although
it is dominating the FDI project and although it is worthier than its
option value. The results of the model undermine empirical findings
which analyze the impact of continuous variables on export and FDI
patterns.
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The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Off 1 INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
The international economic integration of the world has been increasingly influ-
enced by international trade and foreign direct investments in the post world war
two era. According to the UNCTAD data (2006) since then domestic companies
have steadily increased their exports and foreign plant shares (horizontal FDI) to
access new markets for their products. Besides the persistent growth of exports
and horizontal FDI, two additional striking developments can be identified in em-
pirical data. Since the early 1980s the growth expansion of FDI inflows exceeded
that of exports in every year until today (Navaretti and Venables 2004). The
major share of FDI infolws originated in developed countries and were attracted
by the same (Markusen, 2002). However this last development has changed its
nature since 2003, as global FDI inflows have maintained their growth only be-
cause developing countries have started to attract relatively more FDI inflows
whereas developed countries experienced a reduction in their inflow growth rates
(UNCTAD-Statistics, 2006).
Given the increasing importance of exports and FDI, economic analyses focusing
on these two elements of international economics have gained impetus. The first
influential strand of explanation was the Ownership, Location and Internalization
Advantage framework which was developed by John Dunning (1977, 1981). With
the surge of FDI in the 1980s economists started to implement the OLI framework
into formalized analytical models emphasizing different aspects of the three pos-
sible advantages. Among them were Horstman and Markusen (1987), Markusen
and Venables (1998,2000), Brainard (1993), Helpman (1984, 1985), Ethier and
Markusen (1996), Ehtier (1986). These models are either static general equilib-
rium or static partial equilibrium models. Common to the first four mentioned
models is the assumption of different cost structures between export oriented
companies and multinational enterprieses (MNE) which have been considered as
the driving force behind FDI. Brainard (1993) e.g. considers a two country, two
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sector model in which exporters are confronted with higher variable costs than
foreign direct investors due to transport cost. However the domestic production
expansion for exports is associated with scale economies. Whether a company
should serve a foreign market as an exporter or via a FDI solution therefore
depends on the trade-off between scale advantages in the domestic country and
the proximity advantages in the foreign country. The author names this hypoth-
esis the proximity-conentration trade-off (henceforth PCT). In a cross section
analysis between the USA and 26 countries Brainard (1997) proves the empirical
significance of his hypothesis and concludes:
The proximity-concentration hypothesis predicts that firms should expand horizon-
tally across borders whenever the advantage of access to the destination market
outweigh the advantages from production scale economies. (Brainard, 1997)
The next influential strand of analytical models which explain export and FDI
behavior, appeared under the umbrella of the so called New New Trade Theory,
referring to monopolistic competition models which include uncertainty over the
productivity of firms that intend to enter new markets.1 Based on the milestone
work of Marc J. Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) develop a
model in which firms chose between an export and FDI solution to serve a for-
eign market, in the presence of the proximity-concentration trade-off. However in
contrast to earlier models, firms don’t know there productivity performance until
they execute the respective investment (domestic, export and FDI). Once the
companies are involved in one of the three possible investment strategies, they
finally experience their productivity. Based on the described ex ante uncertainty
over productivity the model predicts that the most productive firms will become
foreign direct investors, less productive one will export and the lesser productive
one will stay domestic sellers. The least productive companies will disappear
from the markets. The authors are analysing U.S. exports and affiliate sales data
1 A concise literature overview of the latest developments in the new new trade theory is presented
by Helpman (2006).
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covering 38 countries and 52 manufacturing sectors and are able to prove the
significance of their model.
As risk and sunk costs are crucial elements in investment decisions of investors,
their implementation into the latest models is a major step forward. However
taking further empirical literature into account which deals with export and FDI
decision associated with risk, it turns out, that the type of the incorporated
risk is crucial for reasonable inferences. In the former model Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple consider risk as a one time shock component. Once the companies
enter the markets, uncertainty disappears. In contrast neat investment models
generally take risk as a time dependent variable (continuous phenomenon) into
account, such as volatile prices in new markets or exchange rate volatility.
Bernard and Jensen (2004) examine export developments for U.S. companies be-
tween 1987 and 1992, a period with a high depreciation of the dollar. The vari-
ables which are taken into account are the volatility of exchange rates, foreign
income growth and productivity growth. Their major finding is that primarily
the change in exchange rates and foreign income growth are the dominant source
for the export boom in the considered period, whereas productivity aspects play
a minor role. In consideration of these findings trade models seems to overesti-
mate the importance of productivity as the major determinant of exports and
therefore additional variables should be taken into account as complementary
aspects. E´gert and Morales-Zumaquero (2007) analyze the impact of exchange
rate volatility on export developments in less developed countries and conclude,
that an increase in exchange rate volatility appears to depress exports. Similar
findings are presented by Esquivel and Larrain (2002) concerning the impact of
exchange rate volatility on FDI and exports. The authors examine the currency
volatility of the three major economic powers (USA, Japan and Germany) and
relate them to exports and FDI flows into developing countries. They are able to
show a negative correlation between forex volatility and FDI. Besides the unan-
imous negative effect of exchange rate volatility – a continuous variable – on
3
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exports and FDI, Bernard and Jensen as well as E´gert and Morales-Zumaquero
emphasize that the negative impact of forex volatility is transmitted with some
delay. Bernard and Jensen relate this delay associated with increased volatility
to sunk costs of entry.
As empirical research is pointing out the importance of additional continuous
variables for the analysis of export and FDI patterns besides productivity, the
development of an appropriate model might contribute to a better understanding
of the international economic developments. Besides the implementation of con-
tinuous volatile variables and sunk costs, the adequate model should also contain
the possibility of delaying export and FDI decisions, since the above mentioned
empirical results provide such a pattern. McDonald and Siegel (1986) provide
a financial model which combines sunk costs, volatile variables and timing to
determine the optimal investment decision of an investors. Their framework be-
came known as the real option approach which has been extend among others
by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Based on this dynamic framework the underlying
paper develops a partial equilibrium trade model with a stochastic process and
derives the proximity-concentration trade-off. In contrast to the former models
investors are not only confronted with the choice between exporting and FDI but
have also the possibility to postpone the investment. Based on the contingent
claims approach it is possible to derive the fair value of an investment associ-
ated with the risk, equivalent to the stochastic process behind the exchange rate
volatility of the real investments (export and FDI). In financial economics this
fair value of a risky return is identified as the option value of an investment. The
optimal investment at any time is derived by comparing the values of the three
different investment possibilities (export, FDI, postponement) with respect to the
comprised risk. Furthermore in equilibrium equal to Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
several cutoff values are derived for the state variable (exchange rate value) which
describe the trigger points for the three different investment opportunities.
4
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2. Theoretical Framework
There is one risk neutral investor who intends to serve a new foreign market
with her output y. The foreign country can either be served by exports or by a
new foreign plant (horizontal FDI). The production function for both investment
choices is given by the concave Cobb-Douglas function (1) with labor l as the
only input factor. There is no labor supply constraint and y provides the output
for each period t with an infinite investment horizon T .
y(l) = lθ with 0 < θ < 1. (1)
In contrast to Bernard (1993) the investor is confronted with decreasing returns
to scale in both investment choices since 0 < θ < 1. Output prices p are given
exogenously on the foreign market (price taker) and are certain. There is also
no uncertainty about the demand on the foreign market. The optimal output
in each term t can be sold completely in the foreign market. Labor costs w are
assumed to be equal and constant in both investment scenarios. In the export
scenario iceberg transport costs occur.2 The produced output in the domestic
country yD shrinks down by the constant factor (1− τ) if it is transferred to the
foreign market and therefore the sold amount yE on the foreign market is given
by
yE = τyD with 0 < τ < 1. (2)
For the export investment the corresponding profit flows (cash flows) in each term
are derived from the maximization problem
pit(pt, wt, τt) = max
lt
pt τt l
θ
t − wt lt s.t. yEt = τt yDt s.t. yDt = ltθ. (3)
2 The transport cost technology is given by c(τ) = τyD.
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As a result the labor input demand function in period t is given by
lt =
(
θ pt τt
wt
) 1
1−θ
(4)
and the instantaneous supply function by
yDt (lt) =
(
θ pt τ
wt
) θ
1−θ
. (5)
Clearly if transport costs increase, τ decreases and as a result the optimal supply
of the good decreases. Finally the perpetual cash flows in the export scenario in
each period t turn out to be
pit(pt, wt, τt) = (1− θ)
(
θτt
wt
) θ
1−θ
p
1
1−θ
t . (6)
It is possible to rewrite the cash flows in equation (6) with respect to total variable
costs cE and cF . Since in the FDI scenario no transport cost accrue (τ = 1), total
variable costs are equal to labor cost (cF = w) whereas in the export scenario
total variable costs are given by cE = w
τ
and equation (6) can be restated as
piit(pt, c
i
t) = (1− θ)
(
θ
cit
) θ
1−θ
p
1
1−θ
t with i ∈ {E,F} (7)
with the superscript F refering to the FDI solution and E to the export solution.
Equation (6) demonstrates clearly if transport costs accrue then the cash flows in
each period are declining since τ is decreasing. As a result given the equal labor
costs in both countries the cash flows from the export solution will be smaller
than from the FDI solution. Equation (7) provides an alternative interpretation.
As transport cost accrue total variable cost cE increase and therefore the cash
flows decrease whereas the variable cost in the FDI solution don’t change. One
can conclude if labor costs are equal in both countries and only in the export
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scenario transport cost are accruing then
piEt (pt, c
E
t ) < pi
F
t (pt, c
F
t ). (8)
The first part of the right hand side in equation (6) consists as assumed only of
constant values and therefore it can be summarized to
pi(pt) = Ztp
κ
t (9)
with
Zt = (1− θ)
(
θτt
wt
)( θ1−θ )
and κ =
(
1
1− θ
)
.
The cash flows in equation (9) are convex in goods prices which is a standard re-
sult if the production function has a concave curvature.3 The economic intuition
behind this profit structure is, to possess the ability of an instantaneous input
adjustment if goods prices increase or decrease. Therefore equation (9) is also
know as instantaneous profit function.
The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Off Under Certainty
Although the underlying economic frame does not assume increasing returns to
scale in the domestic plant opposed to the New New Trade Theory, a proximity-
concentration trade-off can still appear if particular cost structures are prevailing.
As the FDI solution is associated with a greenfield investment in the foreign
country it is reasonable to assume higher fixed costs IF for the foreign plant
than fixed costs IE for the domestic plant expansion (exports). The total cost
3 Varian (1992) provides a concise proof for this result.
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structure is given by 4
IE < IF (10)
cE > cF . (11)
Given the costs of the two investment choices and the perpetual cash flows, it is
possible to calculate the value v(p) of each investment if the opportunity cost is
known. In the underlying model δc is assumed to be the exogenous discount rate
without a deeper specification so far. Furthermore the two investments’ values
are expressed in domestic currencies since profits are repatriated. The exchange
rate e is assumed to be fixed and as a consequence there is no uncertainty over
prices, with p as the good price measured in the domestic currency and pf as the
good price in foreign currency
p = epf . (12)
The value functions of the export and foreign direct investment choices are given
by
vE(p) =
ZE(p)κ
δc
− IE (13)
and
vF (p) =
ZF (p)κ
δc
− IF . (14)
Figure (1) depicts these two value function for specific parameter values with
respect to the good price. For prices below the cutoff price pEc none of the two
investment strategies is worth to be started since the cash flows are not covering
the fixed cost and the project values are both negative. For prices between the
two cutoff points pEc and pFc clearly the export solution is dominating the FDI
solution. Due to the lower fixed costs IE the average costs are lower than in the
FDI case and therefore the investor should serve the foreign market by exports.
4 Variable costs in the export scenario are higher due to transport costs, as shown above.
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Figure 1: Proximity-Concentration Trade-Off (Certain Case)
If the good’s price exceeds pFc the FDI solution dominates the export solution
since the lower variable costs show there advantage. In such a case the investor
must serve the market through a foreign plant.
Given the decreasing average costs in the available investment strategies the
proximity-concentration trade-off can be reformulated as:
proposition 1:
Firms should expand horizontally across borders whenever the advantage of lower
variable costs due to the lack of transport costs outweighs the advantage of lower
fixed costs of a domestic production expansion.
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3. Investment Choice Under Uncertainty
So far there was no uncertainty concerning the repatriated profits of foreign sales
since the exchange rate was assumed to be constant over time. Obviously the
assumption of constant exchange rates is not valid for many bilateral relations
and given the empirical results of Bernard and Jensen (2004) as well as those of
Esquivel and Larrain (2002) a theoretical analysis of export and FDI decisions of
investors under uncertain exchange rates can contribute to these findings.
The effects of volatile exchange rates on risk neutral investors can be twofold.
Volatility can generate an appreciation of the exchange rate and therefore in-
vestors can expect higher foreign cash flows. Henceforth such an expectation is
called the risk driven appreciation. On the other hand volatility can lead to a
depreciation of the exchange rate which reduces foreign cash flows if they are
repatriated. Henceforth such an expectation is called risk driven depreciation.
One crucial question in the presence of these two expectation is, which effect
will dominate and influence the final investment decision. Before the theoretical
framework of section two is extended by risk, I first present a simpler case to
establish the tools for the final analysis in the next section.
In contrast to the previous section the cash flows are assumed to depend only on
p instead of pκ as in equation (13) and (14).
It is assumed that the exchange rate e follows a geometric Brownian motion
de = αedt+ σedz with dz = 
√
dt. (15)
Risk appears therefore because of the volatility of exchange rates. Since the
repatriated profits are calculated on the basis of equation (12) and foreign prices
are assumed to be certain, the uncertainty behind the prices measured in domestic
currency will be the same as in equation (15). Therefore henceforth the analysis
10
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will use the prices in domestic currencies p with
dp = αpdt+ σpdz with dz = 
√
dt (16)
as the uncertain variable in the model. In equation (16) α is the expected growth
rate of the price (e.g. due to macroeconomic developments) and σ is the variance
parameter. dz represents a Wiener process and is responsible for the uncertainty
in the product prices p.  is a randomly distributed variable with the mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one (standard normal distribution). Therefore
E(dz) = 0 and E [(dz)2] = dt.5
Given the uncertain price development in p, an investor who aims to receive
profits for her project, is no longer confronted with a simple investment choice
between exports and FDI, based on a traditional net present value (NPV) compar-
ison. Additionally the investor can postpone the investment decision by a certain
period to gather additional information about the behavior of the uncertain vari-
able. Clearly gathering information by waiting is associated with return losses
since the investment is not taking place. Simultaneously the waiting strategy
offers the possibility to observe the behavior of the volatile variable and therefore
the respective profit maximization can deliver a higher optimum. McDonald and
Siegel (1986) name this additional value which can be achieved by waiting the
option value of an investment. They derive an investment rule which includes
the option value of a project and it turns out that the fair value of an investment
must be not only higher than its investment cost (Marshallian rule) but much
higher. One major challenge within the described frame is the determination of
the option value F (p) of an investment. The objective of the remaining part is
the formal derivation of the investment rule including the option value for the
underlying export and FDI projects under uncertainty.
5 E refers to the expected value.
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The Fair Value Of A Risky Asset
One possibility to calculate the fair value of an investment including the option
value F is offered by the contingent claims valuation. This approach assumes that
the final good of a project is traded on capital markets and F can be replicated
by using the uncertain price of that final good. Of course not every good which is
sold in foreign countries is traded on capital markets and therefore the replication
method would be only applicable to a restricted set of investments. However
even if the final good of a real investment is not available on capital markets, the
replication method can be applied to evaluate the fair value of the real project
based on other assets or a portfolio of assets which comprise the same risk pattern
as the real investment. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) refer to this approach as asset
spanning. Both methods are common approaches in economics to derive the
value of an option and appendix A and B present the algebraic solutions for
these methods.
In the underlying problem the value of the two projects (export and FDI) are
risky because their value v depends on a stochastic variable p. Therefore the
diffusion process behind the value v could be derived from the volatile prices p
by using the mentioned methods. As a result the option value F (v(p)) of the two
projects could be determined. However this nested approach turns out to deliver
very complicated results. Therefore a third alternative is used here which results
in the same investment rules as the replication and asset spanning method.
A riskless portfolio Θ is constructed by
1. holding one unit of the option F (p)
2. go short n units of an asset, which contains the same risk return pattern as
equation (16) → asset spanning: n = F ′(p)6
3. the short position will require a payment of δF ′(p)p for each period dt.
6 Appendix B provides an analytical prove, that n = F ′(p) is the optimal short position.
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A crucial assumption about the asset which is used to span the risk of the real
investment is, that it pays no dividend. In other words its expected return is
given by µ and results only from its capital gain.
Since this constructed portfolio Θ is riskless, its return must be equal to a riskless
return r[F (p)−F ′(p)]dt, with r as the relative return of a riskless treasury bond.
This can be formulated as
dF (p)− F ′(p)dp− δF ′(p)pdt = r [F (p)− F ′(p)] dt. (17)
dF (p) can be substituted by using Ito’s lemma
dF =
∂F
∂t
dt+
∂F
∂p
dp+
1
2
∂2F
∂x2
σ2p2dt. (18)
The result for the option value F (p) is a second order differential equation which
is linear in its dependent variable and its derivatives
1
2
σ2p2F ′′(p) + (r − δ)pF ′(p)− rF (p) = 0.7 (19)
Therefore this homogeneous equation has a guess solution consisting of any two
linearly independent solutions
F (p) = A1p
β1 + A2p
β2 (20)
with
β1 =
1
2
− r − δ
σ2
+
√[
r − δ
σ2
− 1
2
]2
+
2r
σ2
> 1 (21)
β2 =
1
2
− r − δ
σ2
−
√[
r − δ
σ2
− 1
2
]2
+
2r
σ2
< 0. (22)
Based on equation (20) it is possible to formulate investment rules for an investor.
By taking these rules into account it is possible to determine the constants A1,
7 The effect of Ft(p) is neglected, since in the underlying continious case dt approaches zero.
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A2 and the threshold value p∗, which triggers the real investment.
The first conditions is given by
F (0) = 0. (23)
It simply state that the option F (p) should be worthless if the price of the un-
derlying asset is equal to zero. Since β2 is negative, condition (23) can only be
true if A2 = 0. As a result the guess solutions for equation (20) is reduced to
F (p) = Apβ. (24)
Two additional conditions are necessary to determine the trigger price p∗ and the
parameter A. These conditions are derived by considering the option value F (p)
at the threshold price p∗. First in equilibrium the value of the option F (p∗) must
be equal to the net value of the real investment v(p∗)− I.
F (p∗) = v(p∗)− I (25)
Equation (25) is referred to as thematching condition. Additionally for optimality
the derivative of the option value must be equal to the derivative of the real
investment value
Fp(p
∗) = vp(p∗). (26)
Equation (26) is referred to as the smooth-pasting condition or higher-order con-
tact. If the two functions were not smooth at the trigger price p∗ a better maxi-
mum would be available. By using these conditions it is possible to determine the
cutoff price for the underlying uncertain investment at which the option value oft
the project is equal to the real investment. Precisely explained at p∗ the investor
is indifferent whether she should still postpone the investment or not. However
for prices bigger than the cutoff price clearly the real investment should be initi-
14
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ated.
Before the optimal investment rule can be derived it is necessary to have a closer
look on the value of the real investment v(p) given the risk. An investor who
holds the real investment associated with the risk in (16) over a period dt will
expect the following returns
1. The expected appreciation of the price (α)
2. Dividend (δ)
The investor will therefore expect a total return of
µ = δ + α. (27)
Equation (27) represents an expected return rate which compensates the owner
of the considered investment given its risk, described by equation (16).
Obviously risk is one major aspect within this valuation concept and should
be therefore defined in a more rigorous manner. In the following risk refers
always to nondiversifiable risk, because with reference to the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM), diversifiable risk can be eliminated by constructing appropriate
portfolios. Given a market portfolio M and a riskless bond, it is possible to
determine the appropriate return for any risk rate on the considered financial
market.
Once the return for the market portfolio M ’s risk rate is known, it is possible to
determine the risk premium for any asset on the market, based on the covariance
or correlation between the market portfolio M and the respective asset (Sharpe,
1964).
15
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µA = r + Λ σAρMA (28)
with
Λ =
(µM − r)
σM
(29)
Equation (28) states, given the correlation coefficient ρ between the market port-
folio return and the considered investment return, and given Λ (the market price
of risk), the expected total return rate of the considered asset is a sum of the
riskless rate and a respective risk premium. µ therefore represents also the risk-
adjusted discount rate, which will be of importance below.
Given the so far assumed simplified cash flows p of equation (16) it is possible
to calculate the expected present value v(p) by using the risk adjusted discount
rate µ.8 As the expected cash flows are given by E(pt) = pe
αt the risk adjusted
value of the real investment is given by
v(p) =
∫ ∞
0
peαte−µtdt =
p
δ
. (30)
The interpretation of equation (30) is as follows. If the option of the investment
is kept alive and the project is postponed, the investor won’t receive the dividend
payments of the real investment. Therefore δ appears as opportunity cost and
can be used to evaluate the risk adjusted real investment value v(p).
With the appropriate value of the real investment it is possible to formulate the
final investment rule for a risky project including its option value. The functional
8 In the underlying case speculative bubbles are ruled out.
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forms of the matching and smooth pasting condition deliver
Apβ =
p
δ
− I (31)
βApβ−1 =
1
δ
. (32)
Solving equation (31) for A results in
A =
p1−β
δ
− Ip−β. (33)
Substituting A into equation (32) provides the solution for the equilibrium price
p∗ which determines the execution of the real investment.
βpβ−1
[
p1−β
δ
− Ip−β
]
=
1
δ
β − 1 = βδI
p
The cutoff price p∗ results as
p∗ =
[
β
β − 1
]
δI. (34)
Calculating the value v(p) of the real investment on the basis of the cutoff price
p∗ and equation (30) provides the threshold value v∗ which can be interpreted as
the optimal investment rule under uncertainty.
v(p∗) =
[
β
β − 1
]
I (35)
17
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The parameter A of the option value function is then
A = I1−β
(δβ)−β
(β − 1)1−β .
9 (36)
It is easier to interpret the economic intuition behind equation (35) if a numerical
example is presented. Assume that the investments cost of a project is I = 1 with
a volatility of the cash flows of σ = 0.2. The riskless interest rate is r = 0.05 and
δ = 0.05. With these parameter values β = 2.16 and the investment rule states
v∗ = 1.86 I. Therefore the underlying risky investment should be executed if its
value is at least 1.86 times higher than the corresponding costs I. Clearly this is
a huge difference to the Marshallian rule which states that an investment should
be put into effect if the value of the project covers the investment costs I.
4. Export And FDI Choice Under Uncertainty
After presenting the general procedure of how to determine the option value of
an investment with a simple risky cash flow pattern p, it is possible to assess
the export and FDI decision of a risk neutral investor within the theoretical
framework of section 2. A switching strategy in form of becoming first an exporter
and then a foreign direct investor is excluded. The investor can choose either to
serve the market as exporter or by founding a foreign plant. For the ease of
reference the cash flows of the two projects are stated again.10
pii(p, ci) = (1− θ)
(
θ
ci
) θ
1−θ
pκ with i ∈ {E,F} and κ = 1
1− θ (37)
Obviously the cash flows in each term have a convex shape in the price p as
the the exponent κ is bigger than 1 due to the concave production technology.
Since the optimal investment rule is derived based on the matching and smooth
9 Appendix D shows the derivation of A.
10The time index t is omitted since an infinite time horizon is considered
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pasting conditions in equation (25) and (26), it is necessary to determine the risk
adjusted value v(p) of the underlying investments. In the first step it is necessary
to calculate the expected growth rate of pκ which is named α′.
d(pκ)
pκ
= relative returns (38)
By using Ito’s lemma this can be stated as
d(pκ)
pκ
=
[
κpκ−1dp+ 1
2
κ(κ− 1)pκ−2σ2p2dt]
pκ
(39)
where dp represents the geometric Brownian motion (16). Substituting dp by
equation (16) delivers
d(pκ)
pκ
=
[
κpκ−1 (αpdt+ σpdz) + 1
2
κ(κ− 1)pκ−2σ2p2dt]
pκ
(40)
= κ (αdt+ σdz) +
1
2
κ(κ− 1)σ2dt (41)
=
(
ακ+
1
2
κ(κ− 1)σ2
)
dt+ κσdz. (42)
Finally the expected growth rate α′ for cash flows of the shape pκ with E(dz) = 0
is given by
α′ = E
(
dpκ
pκ
)
=
(
ακ+
1
2
κ(κ− 1)σ2
)
dt. (43)
Therefore the expected value v(p) of the underlying real investment with a cal-
culated growth rate α′ can be determined if its risk adjusted rate of return µ′ is
known.
v(p) = Zpκe(ακ+
1
2
κ(κ−1)σ2)te(−µ
′)t (44)
Appendix F provides the proof that the risk adjusted rate of return µ′ for the
cash flows pκ are given by
µ′ = r + (µ− r)κ (45)
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with µ as the expected return of cash flows following the geometric Brownian
motion in equation (16). As earlier stated the total expected returns µ of an
investment are generated by its growth rate α and the dividend payments δ
which are both assumed to be constant. Substituting µ = α+ δ in equation (45)
delivers
µ′ = r + (α+ δ)κ− rκ (46)
= (1− κ)r + (α+ δ)κ. (47)
As a consequence it is possible to determine the expected present value v(p) of
the real investment calculated on the basis of the risk adjusted expected return
v(p) = Zpκeα
′te−µ
′t (48)
= Zpκe−δ
′t. (49)
Differently expressed the expected risk adjusted returns µ′ of an investment with
Zpκ as cash flows must be generated by their growth rate α′ and the adjusted
dividends δ′.
µ′ = α′ + δ′ (50)
Finally the risk adjusted value of the real investment turns out to be
v(p) = Zpκe(ακ+
1
2
σ2κ(κ−1))te(−(1−κ)r−ακ−δκ)t (51)
= Zpκe(
1
2
σ2κ(κ−1)−r+κr−δκ)t (52)
v(p) =
Zpκ
r − κ(r − δ)− 1
2
σ2κ(κ− 1) (53)
with the risk adjusted discount rate as
δ′ = r − κ(r − δ)− 1
2
σ2κ(κ− 1). (54)
20
The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Off 4 EXPORT OR FDI
As it can be seen for a production technology with constant returns to scale
(κ = 1) the risk adjusted discount rate δ′ is equal to the dividend payments
δ of the investment. The fair value of the real investment with a convex cash
flow structure turns out to be risk sensitive. Holding the dividend payments
δ constant, as assumed, an increase in the volatility σ of prices decreases the
risk adjusted discount rate δ′ and therefore increases the expected value of the
investment. Technically this result is driven by the convexity of the underly-
ing function since its expected value will become higher according to Jensen’s
inequality. Therefore I refer to this result as convexity-effect. Given such a struc-
ture an investor will have a higher incentive to execute an investment the higher
the price volatility is. One could interpret this result as a risk driven appreciation.
The Optimal Investment Rule In The Underlying Framework
Once the value v(p) of the real investment with the cash flow pattern pκ is known,
it is possible to derive the threshold values for the export and FDI choices of an
investor. For an investment which is volatile due to the price volatility in equation
(16) the corresponding general value function F (p) is given by
F (p) = Apβ. (55)
For a detailed derivation see section 3. The corresponding optimality conditions
are therefore given by
F (0) = 0 (56)
Apβ =
Zpκ
δ′
− I (57)
βAp(β−1) =
κZpκ−1
δ′
(58)
where equation (57) and (58) represent the matching and smooth pasting condi-
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tions. Under these conditions the optimal cutoff price turns out to be
p∗ = κ
√
β
β − κI
δ′
Z
(59)
with
β =
1
2
− r − δ
σ2
+
√[
r − δ
σ2
− 1
2
]2
+
2r
σ2
> 1 (60)
and
A = Z
((
β Iδ
(β − κ)Z
)κ−1)κ−β
δ−1 − I
((
β Iδ
(β − κ)Z
)κ−1)−β
(61)
Appendix E provides a concise derivation of the value p∗. The corresponding
investment rule for the underlying production structure is therefore given by
v(p∗) =
β
β − κI. (62)
Clearly if the volatility σ of the prices p increase, the parameter β decreases.
Simultaneously β
β−κ increases and the threshold price p
∗ increases as well. The
same effect drives up the expected investment value v(p∗). As it can be seen
the demanded real investment value is much higher than the investment costs
I since the wedge β
β−κ is bigger than one. In other words, an investor who
includes the option value F (p∗) in her assessment will demand higher exchange
rate prices (appreciation) if their volatility increases. This can be interpreted as
a risk driven depreciation of a real investment which is a countermovement to
the earlier presented risk driven appreciation. Since the effect can be explained
by observing β, I refer to this result as the β-effect.
Given the assumed different cost structures for the export and the FDI choice
of an investor with IE < IF and cE > cF , the optimal investment strategies for
each investment can be formulated separately including the option values.
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A(pi)
β =
Zi(pi)
κ
δ′
− I i (63)
and
βA(pi)
β−1 =
κZi(pi)
κ−1
δ′
(64)
with i ∈ {E,F}
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Figure 2: Threshold price pE for Export under uncertainty
In figure (2) the price level pEc represents the cutoff price under certainty which
was derived in figure (1). Under certainty the investor should expand her domestic
output for exports if prices are higher than pEc. The introduction of uncertainty
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has two effects which are influencing the cutoff price, namely the convexity and
β-effect. In the figure (2) the continuous line represents the expected value of
the export project. Due to the convexity-effect, the value function v(p) is shifted
up as the price volatility increases. In a scenario where the option value F (p) of
the investment is neglected, the investor would become an exporter if the prices
are higher than pE. The dashed line represents the option value of the export
strategy and according to the optimality conditions an investor should execute an
investment if F (p) is tangent to the expected investment value v(p). This is the
case for prices bigger than pEu. Obviously the β-effect increases the cutoff price
of the export strategy and a risk neutral investor will postpone the investment
until the price level is bigger than the new cutoff price pEu. The crucial result
in figure (2) is that the β-effect is bigger than the convexity-effect. Therefore
uncertainty leads to an investment which takes place at higher prices and implic-
itly later than under certainty. Figure (3) depicts the expected value function
vF (p) for the FDI strategy and the corresponding option value F (p), based on
the same parameter values as earlier. The effects within this strategy have the
same pattern as in the previous export scenario. A risk neutral investor should
postpone her investment until the price level pFu is reached. The new cutoff price
is significantly higher than under certainty.
Finally it is possible to analyze the investment strategy of the risk neutral investor
who can choose between the export strategy, FDI and the postponement of each
strategy. Figure (4) depcits the value functions vE(p) for the export strategy and
vF (p) for the FDI strategy as continuous lines. The corresponding option values
are represented by the dashed lines FE(p) and F F (p).11 The resulting cutoff
prices provide the following investment plan. If the price p measured in domestic
currency is smaller than pE the investor should wait and neither of the two in-
vestment strategies is executed, since the option values of both investments are
higher than their expected values vi(p). For prices between pE and pE2 the ex-
11The underlying parameter values are the same as before.
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Figure 3: Threshold price pF for FDI under uncertainty
port strategy turns out to be dominant because it is bigger than the option value
of both strategies and also higher than the expected value of the FDI strategy.
Therefore the investor should serve the foreign market through exports. However
if the prices are between the cutoff levels pE2 and pF then the investor should
postpone both projects since the option value of the FDI strategy is the highest
value function. The economic intuition behind this price range is as follows. By
waiting, the investor has the chance to observe the market and gather additional
information concerning the FDI strategy. Given the price volatility in p the FDI
strategy offers a potential higher return than the export strategy and therefore
waiting is rational.12 Unfortunately it is not possible to determine the time span
12Such a strategy excludes strategic interaction between firms. It is assumed that there is no
disadvantage if a firm enters a country later
25
The Proximity-Concentration Trade-Off 4 EXPORT OR FDI
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
−1000
−500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
p=e p*
Va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
oje
ct/
 O
pti
on
 V
alu
e
VF(p)−IF
VE(p)−IE
FE(p)
FF(p)
pE pFpE2
Figure 4: Export or FDI under uncertainty
which is reasonable for the postponement of the export strategy.13 In principle
it is possible that p stays in this critical price range and in such a case waiting
would become too expansive. However given the price volatility σ in equation
(16) the probability of such a price behavior is low. The next sections provides
an example in which exporting is postponed although it is profitable. In the long
run waiting costs are easily covered by the higher FDI returns.
Finally for prices bigger than pF the investor should serve the foreign market by
a greenfield investment (FDI). By renaming the option functions of the export
and FDI strategy into FE = Apβ and F F = Bpρ it is possible to present a formal
investment rule.
13 It is important to bear in mind that the investor has not the possibility of switching form
export to FDI. The investment strategy is either export or FDI. Otherwise the problem must
be analyzed in a different way.
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FE(p) =
Ap
β if p ∈ {p, pE}
V E(p)− IE if p ∈ {pE, pE2}
(65)
F F (p) =
Bp
ρ if p ∈ {p, pE}and{pE, pE2}
VF (p)− IF if p ∈ {pF ,∞}
(66)
Comparing the proximity-concentration trade-off under uncertainty with a cer-
tain case provides additional inferences. Five major results can be stated.
1. For an investment with convex profit flows uncertainty provides as such
higher incentives to invest. However taking the option value of it into
account decreases the incentives to invest. (the convexity-effect is smaller
than the β-effect.)
2. Continuous risk increases the trigger price for an export strategy. The price
range in which no export is done increases.
3. Risk also increases the trigger price for an FDI strategy. The price range
in which foreign direct investments are dismissed increases.
4. Even if the export expansion provides positive profits, for certain price levels
it is rational for an investor to postpone the export investment decision since
potential higher FDI profits can be achieved.
5. Implicitly the export and the foreign direct investment will take place later
than under certainty.
The first three results are well analyzed aspects and standard results in the real
option theory. Additionally they provide an explanation for the empirical find-
ings of Bernard and Jensen (2004) as well as for E´gert and Morales-Zumaquero
(2007). Exchange rate volatility has a prohibitive impact on export and FDI
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decisions, as long as investors can postpone their decisions for a certain period.
The fourth result is a new result within the proximity-concentration trade-off.
Although the export expansion would provide profits for an investor, for certain
prices she won’t become an exporter. Instead she will observe the volatile prices
and become a foreign direct investor if the upper cutoff price is reached.
proposition 2:
Firms should choose between serving a market as exporter or foreign direct in-
vestor by calculating the expected real investment values including the respective
option values. Even if the export strategy dominates the expected real FDI profits
the implementation of the option values might suggest a postponement of exports
whenever potential higher returns can be achieved within the FDI strategy due to
price volatility.
5. The Timing OF Export And FDI
Within the real option framework investors are confronted with critical price
values (cutoff prices) which determine the optimal investment strategy. However
these cutoff prices don’t provide an explicit timing suggestion since the incremen-
tal time variable disappears in the theoretical analysis. The lack of the timing
component can be analyzed only in a simulation which leads to arbitrary results.
Still such a simulation gives additional insights about the trade-off between wait-
ing (information gathering) and forgone profits. Figure (5) shows a sample path
for the expected investment values of the export and FDI strategies vi(p)−I i and
the corresponding option values F i(p). The price changes are gauged monthly
and the domestic price level pt is given by
pt = pt−1 (1 +
α
12
) dt+ pt−1 0.2
√
1
12
t. (67)
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Figure 5: The timing of export and FDI
At each time t a random number t is drawn from a normal distribution with zero
mean and a unit standard deviation. An initial price level p0 = 1.5 is assumed.
14
By using the earlier derived value functions it is possible to compare the two
investment strategies over time. Under the assumed parameter values the export
strategy would provide positive returns after 5 months already. However as its
option value FE(pt) (upper dashed line) is bigger than its net investment value
(lower dashed line), a rational investor postpones the investment. It turns out
that the postponement is a good choice as the price development in the following
months is negative and the export strategy would provide losses. After 32 months
the first matching condition (FE(pt) = v
E(pt)) is fulfilled and an investor should
serve the foreign market as an exporter if exporting was the only option. However
14 Investors will have a price expectation on the new market. In the simplest case p0 will be equal
to the domestic sales price.
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once the export decision is established in the underlying model it is not possible
to switch to FDI as an alternative mode. Therefore the investor has to consider
the potential value of the FDI strategy. At that time clearly the option value
of the FDI strategy dominates the export strategy and therefore the investor
should postponed the investment decision although exporting generates profits.
Finally after 42 months the second matching conditions appears and the best
strategy turns out to be the foreign direct investment strategy. Furthermore if
one compares the profits of the export and FDI strategies from that time on it
turns out that the FDI strategy provides significantly higher returns and recovers
the forgone export gains between the 32nd and 42nd month easily.
6. Conclusion
In the underlying model the export and FDI decisions of an investor have been
analyzed on the basis of the proximity-concentration trade-off. In contrast to
the New New Trade Theories which use the proximity-concentration hypothesis
likewise to explain export and FDI behavior like Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004), my model takes risk not as a one time shock effect into account but as a
continuous phenomenon. Since foreign sales are confronted with foreign exchange
rate, the model includes the exchange rate in form of a geometric Brownian
motion over an infinite time. In contrast to the static models, investors have the
possibility to postpone their investment decisions, since competitive interaction
is assumed to be not existent. As a result the investment choice of a risk neutral
investor turns out to be highly influenced by the volatility of the exchange rate.
Due to the convexity of the cash flows in the underlying model, volatility turns out
to increase the incentive to invest earlier in a market. Whether as an exporter or
a foreign direct investor depends on the price level. However simultaneously the
inclusion of the option value into the investment decision turns out to erase the
positive effect of risk because waiting becomes valuable as additional information
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concerning the volatile exchange rate can be collected. In the underlying model
the first effect (convexity-effect) is always dominated by the incentive decreasing
effect (β-effect). Therefore exchange rate volatility turns out to increase the
postponement of export and FDI projects until the price level reaches a specific
cutoff point. Since the investor in the underlying model has only the choice
between either export or FDI, the implementation of the option value provides
an additional result which is not existent in the prevailing trade models. Even if
the export profits turn out to be higher than the FDI returns, the model predicts
that the investor will still observe the market instead of becoming an exporter
for certain price levels. This result is based on the value of waiting during which
additional information can be collected. A trade-off between the value of waiting
and the forgone export profits appears which is generated by the volatile exchange
rate.
The theoretical results of the model are coinciding with the empirical results
of models which analyze the export and FDI decision including the exchange
rate. Bernard and Jensen (2004) conclude that an increase in the exchange rate
volatility (in their case, through depreciation of the dollar) exports started to
increase, however after a time lag. The incentive decreasing effect of risk has been
proved as well by E´gert and Morales-Zumaquero (2007). Given this congruency
between the theoretical result of the model and the empirical findings the paper
contributes to a better understanding of export and FDI patterns over time.
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Appendix
A. The structure of the replicated portfolio
The option value F (u) of an investment with profit flows pi(u) can be determined
by using the tradeable good of the project which contains the same risk and
return pattern as the investment.15
Assume that the project is associated with the following geometric Brownian
motion
du = αudt+ σudz. (68)
In the first step a riskless portfolio is constructed by using the tradeable good and
a riskless treasury bond. Specifically one Euro is invested into a treasury bond
and simultaneously n units of the firms output are bought on the market. This
portfolio has a value of (1+nu) Euros. If this portfolio is held by an investor for
a period of dt, the returns are:
1. r dt generated by the bond
2. nδu dt the dividend, generated by the traded good
3. additionally there is a capital gain of n du
The total return of the portfolio for a period dt is given by
δnu dt+ nαu dt+ nuσ dz + r dt. (69)
The total relative return of the portfolio is given by
[r + nu+ (δ + α)] dt
1 + nu
+
nu σ dz
1 + nu︸ ︷︷ ︸ . (70)
risky part
15The underlying derivation is based on Dixt and Pindyck (1994).
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where the righthand side of equation (70) describes the risky part of the total
return. Now consider the hypothetical return from holding the investment in the
project with a value of F (u) over the same period of dt. The payoff structure
associated with the investment is containing
1. the costs of the investment F (u)
2. received dividends in form of the profit flows pi(u)dt which are certain, since
they are known at the initial decision
3. capital gain dF (u).
The capital gain dF (u) can be calculated by using Ito’s lemma:
dF =
[
Ft(u) + αu Fu(u) +
1
2
σ2u2 Fuu
]
dt+ σu Fu(u) dz. (71)
In the following the effect of Ft(u) will be neglected since it is infinitesimal small.
The resulting relative return of the investment is given by[
pi(u) + αu Fu(u) +
1
2
σ2u2 Fuu
]
dt
F (u)
+
σu Fu(u) dz
F (u)︸ ︷︷ ︸ (72)
risky part
The replicated portfolio will have the same risk pattern as the investment project
if the risk associated parts of the relative returns in equation (70) and (72) are
equal:
nu σ dz
1 + nu
=
σu Fu(u) dz
F (u)
(73)
⇒
nu
1 + nu
=
u Fu(u)
F (u)
(74)
Equation (74) represents our assumption that the Wiener processes behind the
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traded goods and the project itself are identical. If the replicated portfolio con-
tains the same risk as the project, it must deliver the same relative return.[
pi(u) + αu Fu(u) +
1
2
σ2u2 Fuu
]
F (u)
=
r + nu (δ + α)
1 + nu
(75)
According to condition (74) we receive by substitution
pi(u) + αu Fu(u) +
1
2
σ2u2 Fuu
F (u)
=
r
1 + nu
+
u Fu(u) (δ + α)
F (u)
. (76)
It can be shown that
r
1 + nu
=
r(1− nu) + nu
1 + nu
(77)
=
r
(1 + nu)
− rnu
1 + nu
+
rnu
1 + nu
= r − rnu
1 + nu
and according to equation (74)
r
1 + nu
= r
[
1− u Fu(u)
F (u)
]
(78)
Combining this result with equation (76) leads to
pi(u) + αu Fu(u) +
1
2
σ2u2 Fuu
F (u)
= r
[
1− u Fu(u)
F (u)
]
+
u Fu(u) (δ + α)
F (u)
. (79)
Simplification delivers
pi(u) + αu Fu(u) +
1
2
σ2u2 Fuu(u) = rF (u)− ru Fu(u) + (α+ δ)u Fu(u) (80)
pi(u) + αu Fu(u) +
1
2
σ2u2 Fuu(u)− αu Fu(u)− δu Fu(u) + ru Fu(u)− rF (u) = 0
(81)
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pi(u) +
1
2
σ2u2 Fuu(u)− rF + (r − δ)u Fu(u) = 0 (82)
Finally a second order differential equation results which is linear in the depen-
dant variable F (p) and its derivatives. Therefore the option value of an invest-
ment can be solved by any linear combination of two independent combinations.
F (u) = Auβ (83)
with
β =
1
2
− r − δ
σ2
+
√[
r − δ
σ2
− 1
2
]2
+
2r
σ2
. (84)
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B. Valuation by asset spanning
The replication of a so called equivalent portfolio is conditioned on the fact that
the output of the firm is traded on a financial market. However this must not be
the case. In such a situation it is still possible to determine the appropriate value
of a firm or project if one assumes, the financial markets are efficient and any risk
return relationship can be acquired by an investor. Instead of replicating a riskless
portfolio, the investor is supposed to span a portfolio which is riskless. Under
such conditions a project can be valued in a similar way as in the replication
method (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
Instead of assuming that the output itself is trade on the financial market, it is
assumed that there exists an asset or a portfolio of assets which contain the same
risk pattern as the project which is supposed to be valued. This asset spans the
risk of the considered project. X is the market price of the spanning asset and is
given by:
dX = A(p, t)Xdt+ S(p, t)Xdz. (85)
It is assumed that the stochastic fluctuation of the spanning asset price X is
perfectly correlated with the stochastic fluctuation of the output prices p. Dif-
ferently expressed, the two Wiener processes behind dp and dX must be equal
(dzX = dzp). Furthermore the two coefficients A(p, t) and B(p, t) are functions
of the output price p, which simply points out that the considered asset price
contains the same information as the output price.
Furthermore the spanning asset pays a dividend rate of D(p, t) over a period dt
for one invested Euro. Holding one Euro invested in the asset over a period dt
delivers a total return of
[D(p, t) + A(p, t)] dt+B(p, t) dz. (86)
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As explained earlier according to the CAPM the appropriate expected return for
an investment is given by
µX(p, t) = r + Λρp,M B(p, t). (87)
The coefficient B(p, t) is representing the standard deviation of the asset price and
since the asset price and the output price are perfectly correlated, the correlation
coefficient between the asset price and the market portfolio price is equal to
the coefficient between the output price and the market portfolio price. Λ is
representing the market price of risk whereas r is the return rate of a riskless asset.
Under these assumptions the total return of the spanning asset in equilibrium is
given by
µX(p, t) = D(p, t) + A(p, t) (88)
the sum of the dividend and the growth rate A(p, t). Otherwise an investor would
be able to generate infinite profits by arbitrage.
The portfolio structure
An investor is supposed to hold a portfolio which consists of an investment in a
project (F (p, t)) and of n units of short positions in the asset X. The value of
this portfolio corresponds to [F (p, t) − nX] Euro and it is hold over a period of
dt. At the end of the period the investor has the following payoffs:
1. For the short position a dividend of D(p, t) p dt must be payed.
2. The project generates a cash flow of pi(p, t)dt.
3. There is a capital gain of dF − ndX.
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The capital gain can be expressed according to Ito’s lemma as
dF − ndX = Ft +
[
aFpp+
1
2
b2Fppp
2 − nAX
]
dt+ [bFp − nBX] dz (89)
where a and b represent the coefficient of the stochastic process for the output
price.
To be able to compare the latter portfolio with the riskless asset, it is necessary
to eliminate the prevailing risk in it. This can be achieved by an appropriate
choice of short positions in X. Equation (89) shows that the appropriate amount
of short positions in the asset X for a riskless portfolio is given if
n = Fp
b
BX
. (90)
After the elimination of the risk the expected return of the new portfolio must
be equal to an equivalent riskless investment. The riskless return over a period
dt is given by
r [F (p, t)− nX] dt. (91)
Therefore the equilibrium condition is given by
dF − n dX + pi(p, t)− nD(p, t)X dt = r [F (p, t)− nX] dt. (92)
Substituting n by equation (90) leads to
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Ft +
[
aFpp+
1
2
b2Fppp
2 − Fp b
B(p, t)
A(p, t)
]
dt+ pi(p, t)−D(p, t)Fp b
B(p, t)
dt
(93)
= rF dt− rFp b
B(p, t)
dt
and
Ft +
1
2
b2Fppp
2 + aFpp+ pi(p, t)− D(p, t) bFp
B(p, t)
− A(p, t) bFp
B(p, t)
− rF + rbFp
B(p, t)
= 0
(94)
Ft +
1
2
b2Fppp
2 + aFpp+ pi(p, t)− b
B(p, t)
Fp (r − (A(p, t) +D(p, t))) (95)
with
µX = A(p, t) +D(p, t). (96)
For the simplest case where A = a = α and B = b = σ and D = δ and neglecting
Ft since dt approaches zero in the continuous case, equation (93) becomes
pi(p) +
1
2
σ2p2 Fpp(p)− rF + (r − δ)p Fp(p) = 0 (97)
which is the same result as in the replication approach.
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C. Solution of a homogeneous differential equation
Given the second order differential equation (19)
1
2
σ2p2F ′′(p) + (r − δ)pF ′(p)− rF (p) = 0
it is possible to state a general guess solution of the form
F (p) = Apβ (98)
since the differential equation is linear in the dependent variable F . Substituting
the guess solution in equation (19) results in the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2β(β − 1)Apβ + (r − δ)βApβ − rApβ = 0 (99)
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + (r − δ)β − r = 0. (100)
This quadratic equation is often called the fundamental quadratic equation and
can be reformulated as
Ψ =
1
2
β2 − 1
2
β +
(r − δ)
σ2
β − r
σ2
= 0. (101)
The two solutions for equation (101) are given by
β1 =
1
2
− r − δ
σ2
+
√[
r − δ
σ2
− 1
2
]2
+
2r
σ2
> 1 (102)
β2 =
1
2
− r − δ
σ2
−
√[
r − δ
σ2
− 1
2
]2
+
2r
σ2
< 0. (103)
Therefore the proper shape of the guess solution is given by
F (p) = A1p
β1 + A2p
β2 . (104)
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However, due to the first optimality condition
F (0) = 0 (105)
the second solution with β < 0 can be neglected. Otherwise the condition is not
fulfilled.
The total differential of the fundamental quadratic equation Ψ delivers some
important comparative results.
As the volatility σ increases, β1 will decrease. This has an important impact on
the wedge in equation (62), since β
β−κ will increase and therefore the expected
trigger value of the investment will increase, too.
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D. The calculation of the option parameter A
Given the homogeneous differential equation
1
2
σ2p2F ′′(p) + (r − δ)pF ′(p)− rF (p) = 0 (106)
for the Brownian motion
dp = αpdt+ σpdz (107)
the guess solution is represented by
F (p∗) = Apβ. (108)
The cutoff price for cash flows p has been determined as
p∗ =
β
β − 1δI. (109)
Solving equation (31) for A and substituting p provides
A =
(
β
β − 1δI
)1−β
− I
(
β
β − 1δI
)−β
(110)
=
(
β
β − 1
)(
β
β − 1
)−β
δ−βI1−β − I1−βδ−β
(
β
β − 1
)−β
(111)
A = I1−β
(δβ)−β
(β − 1)1−β . (112)
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E. The threshold price p∗
Given the optimality conditions
F (0) = 0 (113)
Apβ =
Zpκ
δ′
(114)
βAp(β−1) =
κZpκ−1
δ′
(115)
the cutoff price p∗ which determines the investment threshold, can be calculated
as follows. Solving equation (114) for A provides
A =
Zpκ−β
δ′
− Ip−β. (116)
Substituting A in equation (115) provides
βpβ−1
(
Zpκ−β
δ′
− Ip−β
)
=
κZpκ−1
δ′
(117)
βZpκ−1
δ′
− βIp−1 = κZp
κ−1
δ′
(118)
Zpκ =
β
β − κIδ
′ (119)
p∗ = κ
√
β
β − κ
I
Z
δ′ (120)
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F. Risk adjusted rate of return
For the underlying geometric Brownian motion
dp = αpdt+ σpdz (121)
the total expected return is given by
µ = α+ δ. (122)
However the cash flows of the considered companies with the concave production
technology are given by Zpκ, as a convex function. What is the risk adjusted
rate of return for these type of cash flows? By using Ito’s lemma
dF (p, t) =
∂F
dt
dt+
∂F
∂p
dp+
1
2
∂2F
∂p2
(dp)2 (123)
it is possible to reformulate the total expected returns as
E
(
dpκ
pκ
)
=
κpκ−1dp+ 1
2
κ(κ− 1)pκ−2σ2p2dt
pκ
. (124)
Substituting dp provides
E
(
dpκ
pκ
)
=
κpκ−1(αpdt+ σpdz) + 1
2
κ(κ− 1)pκ−2σ2p2dt
pκ
(125)
= κ(αdt+ σdz) +
1
2
κ(κ− 1)σ2dt (126)
= (κα+
1
2
κ(κ− 1)σ2)dt+ κσdz. (127)
In appendix C the fundamental quadratic equation for the underlying problem
was derived as
Ψ =
1
2
β2 − 1
2
β +
(r − δ)
σ2
β − r
σ2
= 0. (128)
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In the case of convex cash flows the fundamental quadratic equation for the
homogeneous part of the corresponding differential equation is given by
ζ =
1
2
κ2 − 1
2
κ+
(r − δ)
σ2
κ− r
σ2
= 0. (129)
This equation can be transformed into
1
2
σ2κ(κ− 1) = r − (r − δ)κ. (130)
Putting relation (130) into equation (127) leads to
(κα+ r − (r − δ)κ) dt+ κσdz. (131)
From equation (122) alpha is given as
α = µ− δ (132)
which can be substituted in equation (131). As a result the expected total return
of the convex cash flows is derived as
E
(
dpκ
pκ
)
= (κ(µ− δ) + r − (r − δ)κ) dt+ κσdz (133)
= (µκ+ r − rκ)dt+ κσdz (134)
= (r + (µ− r)κ)dt+ κσdz. (135)
Since E(dz) = 0 the expected total return of the convex cash flows is given by
µ′ = r + (µ− r)κ. (136)
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